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Be Prepared: Unsuspecting Employers
Are Vulnerable for Title VII Sexual
Harassment Environment Claims
ByJEFFREY S. LYONS*
CONGRESS ENACTED TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
("Tide VII") to protect employees from discrimination in the work-
place. 2 Over the past three decades, however, Title VII hostile work
environment actions have expanded potential liability for employers
to the point that the employers must take preventive measures or be
susceptible to unexpected Title VII suits. An unprepared employer
could be caught off guard in situations where, over the course of an
employee's tenure, the employee endures occasional pranks, or is ex-
posed to occasional sexual epithets, or coarse or vulgar language.
While each of these situations clearly exposes the employee to an un-
savory work environment, individually they may not cross the thresh-
old of an actionable Title VII claim. However, the court might
consider this conduct collectively, and thus the employer may be lia-
ble for creating or maintaining a hostile work environment in viola-
tion of Title VII, even if no individual instance would have violated the
Act.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates how an employer
could be liable for maintaining a hostile work environment in viola-
tion of Tide VII without ever having knowledge that such a hostile
environment existed in his workplace. Consider the following scena-
rio: Kathy Brady was a carpenter for Diamond Construction where she
had built houses for six years. The jobsites where she worked were
typical of construction jobsites in that there was quite a bit of swearing
and workers occasionally played pranks on one another. Everyone at
* Class of 2003. The author would like to thank his wife, Maureen Lyons, for all of
her faith and support.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
2. The Congressional record amending Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991
indicates that the purpose of Title VII is to provide "protections and remedies in order to
deter discrimination . . . and provide meaningful relief for victims of discrimination." 137
CONG. REC. H1662, H1664 (1991).
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Diamond considered Brady typical of the crew. She swore no more or
less than the rest, and occasionally participated in pranks. She was a
good carpenter who normally got along with everyone at the jobsites
and never complained about her job. Brady was a single mother.
Some of the job bosses and other men at work flirted with her from
time to time and sometimes, when they asked her out, she accepted.
One day, Brady came into the job supervisor's office and quit.
Diamond was served a week later with a Title VII sexual harassment
suit. The suit alleged that Diamond maintained a hostile work envi-
ronment and listed fifteen separate instances over the course of the
last two years to support the claim. Even though none of the individ-
ual alleged instances crossed the Title VII threshold of an actionable
offense, the question raised was whether Diamond could still be liable
for maintaining a hostile work environment based on the quantity of
separate instances.
This scenario demonstrates the precise issue addressed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. General Motors Corpora-
tion.3 The Williams court stated that "a work environment viewed as a
whole may satisfy the legal definition of an abusive work environment,
for purposes of a hostile environment claim, even though no single
episode crosses the Title VII threshold. ''4
This Comment addresses the following questions: If no single epi-
sode crosses the Title VII threshold, can an employer reasonably antic-
ipate a hostile work environment suit? Moreover, how can an
employer defend against such a suit? Part I of this Comment provides
the background of Title VII. It explores the evolution of the hostile
environment claim and the current state of the law as to how hostile
environmental claims affect employer liability. Part II discusses the
problem created by a split in authority on the application of the Su-
preme Court's hostile environment test and the ramifications of each
circuit's precedent on employer liability. Part III identifies the
problems for employers and employees created by the Williams deci-
sion. Part IV provides a workable solution for resolving the problems
created by the varying interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.
I. Background
A. Title VII Sexual Harassment
Title VII defines an unlawful employment practice as:
3. 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
4. Id. at 564.
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[F]or an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
5
By its terms, Title VII provides employees with a remedy against
employers when conditions of employment are affected by tangible
employment actions (quid pro quo claims) 6 such as inequities of pay,
and exclusion from promotion, demotion, or discharge. 7 Since Title
VII was passed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and the Supreme Court have broadened their reach to in-
clude instances of harassment that do not rise to the level of tangible
employment action.8 By not requiring a tangible employment action,
the EEOC and the Court have created a new breed of claim, one that
targets work environments that are so pervasively hostile that they con-
structively discriminate against an individual because of sex. There-
fore, acts that make the work environment sufficiently hostile to affect
the conditions of employment become actionable under Title VII. 9
However, to this day, the lower courts still have difficulty defining the
conduct that meets this standard. The reason for this confusion lies in
the lack of clear guidance from either the EEOC guidelines or Su-
preme Court precedent that would allow the lower courts to apply a
uniform standard. 10
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
6. Tangible discrimination cases are "based on threats which are carried out [and]
are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual
remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment
[case]." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
7. See id. at 761.
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
9. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
10. For example, the current standard in the EEOC guidelines states:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Com-
mission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be
made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2002).
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B. Evolution of the Hostile Environment Claim
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines that outline actionable
workplace conduct amounting to sexual harassment." In doing so,
the EEOC essentially created a new form of Title VII action-the hos-
tile work environment claim. The United States Supreme Court distin-
guishes a hostile work environment claim from a quid pro quo claim by
stating that while both are cognizable under Title VII,12 the quid pro
quo claim requires a showing of "explicit or constructive alterations in
the terms or conditions of employment."13 The hostile work environ-
ment claim, however, requires a showing of conduct severe or perva-
sive enough to create a hostile work environment. 14 The Supreme
Court held that " [w] hen the workplace is permeated with 'discrimina-
tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ... that is 'sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment,' . Title
VII is violated."' 5 Case law currently guiding the courts as to what con-
duct constitutes a hostile work environment is grounded in three key
Supreme Court decisions: Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 16 Har-
ris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' 7 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.18
1. Meitor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson
In Meritor, the Supreme Court held for the first time that a claim
of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment was a viola-
tion of Title VII.19 The Court adopted the EEOC guidelines stating,
"Since the guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we
agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment."20 There were essentially two issues before the court.
The first was whether a hostile work environment claim was actionable
11. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
12. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
16. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
18. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
19. See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 66.
20. Id.
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under Title VII, 2 1 and the second was to what extent the employer
could be liable for maintaining such an environment. 22
Ms. Vinson, the plaintiff in Meritor, brought suit alleging that she
had "constantly been subjected to sexual harassment"23 by the branch
manager of the bank where she had been employed for four years.
She alleged there had been instances of sexual relations with the bank
manager and claimed that she did not refuse his advances for fear of
losing herjob.24 The bank's defenses were: (1) Ms. Vinson was not the
victim of sexual harassment because the relationship was consensual,
and (2) holding the employer vicariously responsible for hostile work
environment harassment caused by an employee is improper because
"the employer often will have no reason to know about, or opportu-
nity to cure, the alleged wrongdoing."25 On the issue of the voluntary
relationship, the Court stated that "the fact that sex-related conduct
was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the complainant was not forced to
participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit
brought under Title VII." 26 On the issue of vicarious liability (based
on allowing its employees to conduct themselves in a manner that cre-
ates a hostile work environment) the Court indicated that a per se
rule of strict liability was inappropriate and that agency principles
should probably apply.27 However, the Court did not fully resolve this
issue.
By adopting the EEOC guidelines, Meritor fostered greater protec-
tion for employees against conduct that would not have been actiona-
ble under the quid pro quo doctrine. However, in holding that "[f] or
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment," the opinion fell short of provid-
ing any clear guidance as to what would be considered severe or
21. See id. at 66-67.
22. See id. at 69-70.
23. Id. at 60.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 68-70.
26. Id. at 68.
27. See id. at 73. Justice Marshall wrote that he believed that the question of employer
liability was properly before the Court and criticized the majority for not answering that
question. See id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring). In fact, the question of employer liability
for acts by a supervisor was not squarely answered by the Court for another twelve years in
the Court's companion decisions of Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751
(1998), and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998), discussed infra Part I.C.
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pervasive enough to create such an environment. 28 That same issue
presented itself in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
2. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
In Harris, the plaintiff was a manager at defendant Forklift Sys-
tems. 29 At work, Ms. Harris was bombarded with sexual innuendo and
sex-based epithets by Mr. Hardy, the president of the company.30 She
alleged that the harassing conduct of Mr. Hardy forced her to quit her
job.31 The lower court found the case close but stated that the con-
duct of Mr. Hardy was not "so severe as to be expected to seriously
affect [Harris's] psychological well-being. '32 The facts of Harris placed
the issue squarely before the Court to determine how the "severe and
pervasive" analysis should be applied.
The Supreme Court held that the conduct does not have to rise
to the level of tangible psychological injury before it becomes actiona-
ble. 33 In an attempt to clarify the "severe and pervasive" language pro-
vided by Meritor, Justice O'Connor, writing for the unanimous Court,
declared:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no Title VII
violation. 34
The Court then went on to state that "whether an environment is
'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all of the
circumstances. '3 5 The Court described its totality of circumstances test
by acknowledging that while no single factor is required, the factors to
be examined are the frequency and severity of the discriminatory con-
duct, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating,
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.3 6
28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
29. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 20 (quoting Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at A-34-35, Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
33. See id. at 21.
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. Id. at 23.
36. See id.
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Harris resulted in the development of a totality of the circum-
stances test and an objective/subjective test.3 7 The totality of circum-
stances test focuses on factors that determine the severity and type of
conduct alleged and how it interferes with the employee's work per-
formance.3 8 The objective/subjective analysis, in essence, asks two
questions: (1) would a reasonable person perceive the environment as
hostile or abusive, and (2) did the plaintiff perceive the environment
as hostile or abusive?39 However, Harris failed to crystallize Meritor's
"severe and pervasive" analysis. Whether the totality of the circum-
stances test applies to the objective and subjective analysis, or whether
it is a separate test mandating an examination of the existing work
environment, was still left to the interpretation of the lower courts.
3. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
In 1998, the Court, in Oncale, refined the Harris test for a hostile
work environment. The plaintiff in Oncale was a man employed as part
of a crew on an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.40 Mr.
Oncale alleged sexual harassment, including physical abuse by other
male members of the crew, and that complaints to his supervisors
went unheeded. 4 1 The district court dismissed the case, and the court
of appeals affirmed, stating that as a male, Mr. Oncale had no Title
VII claim for sexual harassment for the actions by other male employ-
ees. 42 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded.4 3 Because Oncale was a same-sex sexual harassment claim,
the Court had to focus carefully on the objective and subjective sever-
ity of the conduct.44 The case presented an opportunity to demon-
37. See id. at 22-23. See also Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179,
193 (4th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999)
(demonstrating the lower courts' application of the totality of the circumstances test
promulgated by Harris).
38. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
39. See id. at 21.
40. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 82.
44. The problem in same sex sexual harassment cases is proving that the target of the
harassment actually (subjectively) perceived that the conduct was directed at him because
of the plaintiff's sex and was not merely boorish and rude behavior. In Oncale, the plaintiff
claimed that he felt he would have been raped if he had not quit his job. See id. at 77. In the
Court's opinion Justice Scalia noted that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 80.
However, the plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged
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strate exactly how the objective and subjective analyses mandated by
Harris should be applied.
In Oncale, the Court finally answered the question of how the to-
tality of the circumstances test and the objective/subjective analyses
from Harris fit together. For a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia wrote
that a hostile work environment is to be assessed by inquiring whether
"a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all the
circumstances' would consider the environment hostile, and "that in-
quiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which par-
ticular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. '45 This
holding requires the totality of the circumstances inquiry to apply to
both the objective and subjective prongs of the Harris test. Further-
more, the decision indicates that consideration of the social context
of the behavior (i.e., the nature of the workplace environment where
the conduct took place) is particularly relevant to the subjective analy-
sis because the social context has to be examined in relation to how it
is experienced by its target.
By incorporating the totality of the circumstances analysis into
the objective and subjective inquiry, the Oncale analysis focused more
on the perception of the target of the alleged conduct in its social
context, rather than examining the nature of the work environment
in the abstract, as the Harris totality of the circumstances test sug-
gested. This approach allows for a more reasonable inquiry because
some conduct is sexual harassment no matter where it occurs, but the
same conduct may not be sexual harassment depending on to whom it
occurs because it would depend on how the target subjectively per-
ceives the conduct.
The EEOC guidelines and Meritor provided the basic framework
for the analysis of a Title VII hostile environment claim, and Harris
refined that framework. Oncale is the most recent analysis provided by
the Supreme Court, but it still presents problems in its application as
demonstrated by the circuit split described below in Part III.
C. Evolution of Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Claims
While the hostile work environment claim was refined by the Mer-
itor, Harris, and Oncale decisions, the Court still had to confront the
question of employer liability that was left open by Meritor.46 In Meritor,
with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discrimination because of...
sex."' Id. at 81.
45. Id. at 81.
46. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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Justice Rehnquist indicated that agency principles should probably ap-
ply to determine the extent of the employer's liability, but did not
specifically state that they would.47 However, Justice Marshall, in his
concurrence, unequivocally imputed agency principles to the situa-
tion by stating that he would hold the employer liable for actionable
conduct by a supervisor of the victim. 48 This was the exact issue before
the Court in the companion decisions of Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton,49 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.50
Twelve years after Meitor, the Court adopted Justice Marshall's
concurrence and held that an employer can be liable for an actiona-
ble hostile environment created by a supervisor who had immediate
authority over the employee. 51 For Title VII claims the Court imputed
any tangible employment action taken by the supervisor as the act of
the employer.5 2 Furthermore, an employer will be responsible for any
"tangible employment action [that] constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as: hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
ment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits."53 Undoubtedly, tangible employ-
ment action by a supervisor is actionable under Title VII. However,
tangible employment action is often absent in hostile work environ-
ment claims. In those instances, the inquiry into the employer's liabil-
ity becomes less certain. Because there may be no tangible evidence
(i.e., no paper trail indicating demotions or other significant changes
in an employee's benefits) that a hostile work environment has been
created by an employee's supervisor, the hostile environment claim
can catch the employer unaware that any problems existed.
The Court noted this potential problem in stating that
"[w]hether the agency relation aids in commission of supervisor har-
assment which does not culminate in a tangible employment action is
less obvious. '54 If no tangible employment action was taken (as in a
hostile environment claim), the Supreme Court has offered the em-
ployer a two-pronged affirmative defense: "(a) that the employer exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
47. See id.
48. See id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
50. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
51. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
52. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
53. Id. at 761.
54. Id. at 763.
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failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. '55
In order for an employer to assert an affirmative defense, the em-
ployer must make a showing that it took reasonable measures to edu-
cate its employees on proper conduct (prevention) and to monitor its
workplace to address complaints by its employees (correction) .56 The
second prong of the affirmative defense requires the employer to
show that the plaintiff did not unreasonably take advantage of the
available preventive measures. 57 These are conjunctive requirements
because the second prong could not reasonably exist without the first.
Therefore, an employer can insulate itself from a Title VII hostile
work environment claim if the employer is reasonably diligentin edu-
cating its employees and policing the workplace for instances of im-
proper conduct. However, potential problems still exist for an
employer. For instance, in the Sixth Circuit, courts will allow a claim
based on an aggregation of acts even if no single instance is actionable
under Title VII. 58 In that situation, an employer could be sitting on a
potential time bomb-the employer would have virtually no notice
that actionable behavior was accumulating because no individually ac-
tionable conduct had ever occurred.
D. The Prima Facie Case
The circuit courts of appeals use different variations of four fac-
tors to define the essential elements of a prima facie hostile work envi-
ronment claim.59 These factors are: "(1) plaintiff was a member of a
protected class; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harass-
ment; (3) the harassment was based on plaintiffs sex; and (4) the
harassment created a hostile work environment. ' 60 In Harris, the Su-
55. Id. at 765.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Title VII can still be violated by an aggregate of acts when no single act itself would have
been actionable).
59. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (lst Cir. 2001); Weston
v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001); Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l,
Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 193 (4th Cir. 2000); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir.
2001); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2001). Some
courts include a fifth element: that the plaintiff prove the employer's harassing actions
were foreseeable or part of the scope of the offending supervisor's duty, and that the em-
ployer failed to reasonably respond. However, that element goes more to the degree of
employer liability and not to the establishment of the prima facie hostile work environ-
ment claim, and has largely been addressed by the Court's Faragher and Ellerth decisions.
60. Williams, 187 F.3d at 560.
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preme Court fine-tuned the fourth prong to require conduct severe
or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. 61 Harris
mandated a two-part approach to the severe or pervasive determina-
tion indicating that the courts should use both a totality of the circum-
stances test and an objective-subjective test. 62 Oncale refined Harris by
combining the totality of circumstances and objective-subjective tests
and added that the social context needs to be considered when doing
the analyses. 63 While the courts are willing to follow these holdings,
they are currently split as to whether it should make a difference
whether the alleged conduct occurred in the context of an office or a
shop, or some other location.64
The courts that follow Williams and its progeny, mostly in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, refuse to take the existing work environ-
ment into consideration. 65 Taking a contrary approach, the courts fol-
lowing Gross v. Burggraf 6 and its progeny, mostly in the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, consider the work environment as a factor in making
their determination. 67
II. The Circuit Split
A. Williams v. General Motors Corporation
In Williams, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to con-
sider the work environment as a factor when determining whether the
totality of the circumstances surrounding Williams's claim sufficiently
established a hostile working environment.68 The plaintiff, Marilyn
Williams, worked for General Motors Company ("GMC") for thirty
years.69 The events leading up to her lawsuit occurred while she was
working the midnight shift in the tool crib between May 1995 and May
61. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
62. See id.
63. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
64. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e reject
the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environ-
ment. Thus we disagree with the Tenth Circuit decision in Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53
F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)").
65. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 and its progeny (e.g., O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 729; Rani-
ola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001); Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc.,
227 F.3d 179, 193 (4th Cir. 2000)).
66. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
67. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538; Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408,
1414 (10th Cir. 1997); Sprague v. Thorn Am., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997);
Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 1999).
68. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 560.
69. See id. at 559.
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1996.70 Williams cited fifteen separate incidents that she alleged con-
stituted a hostile working environment.7' The district court grouped
the incidents into four categories: "(1) foul language in the work-
place; (2) mean or annoying treatment by co-workers; (3) perceived
inequities of treatment; and (4) sexually related remarks directed to-
ward [Williams] °"72 Considering the context of the workshop environ-
70. The tool crib is "a warehouse used to store materials and components used at the
plant, from which materials were distributed by an attendant to assemblers who requested
them." Id.
71. See id. The fifteen instances of alleged harassment were listed as follows:
1. Don Giovannoe, an hourly tool crib employee, constantly used the "F-word"
as part of his vocabulary.
2. In June of 1995, as Giovannoe approached the window at the counter of the
tool crib, Appellant [Ms. Williams] heard him say, "Hey slut."
3. In July of 1995, Pat Ryan, her general supervisor, while talking to Williams'
co-worker, Dodie, looked at Williams' breasts and said something to the effect
of "You can rub up against me anytime." He also said, "You would kill me,
Marilyn. I don't know if I can handle it, but I'd die with a smile on my face."
4. A few days after the incident alleged in No. 3, Williams was bending over and
Ryan came up behind her and said, "Back up;just back up," or "You can back
right up to me," or words to that effect.
5. On another occasion, in July of 1995, Williams was sitting at her desk writing
the name "Hancock Furniture Company" on a piece of paper. Ryan came up
behind her, put his arm around her neck and leaned his face against hers,
and said, "You left the dick out of the hand."
6. Workers conspired against her: she was forced to take the midnight shift
when Steve Bivolesky retired, even though Don Giovannoe had originally
agreed to take the job.
7. In September of 1995, when she came in for her midnight shift, she discov-
ered a box of tool crib release forms glued to the top of her desk.
8. Later on the same day she discovered the box glued to her desk, Williams
claims to have heard Giovannoe say, "I'm sick and tired of these fucking wo-
men." As Williams waited on people at the crib window, Giovannoe came over
to the desk and threw a box on it. Williams and Giovannoe got into a verbal
altercation ending with Giovannoe throwing another couple of boxes, the last
of which grazed Williams' [sic] hip, but did not hurt her.
9. Williams claimed that she was denied overtime.
10. She complained that she was the only person who did not have a key to the
office.
11. Williams stated that she was the only person denied a break.
12. She was not allowed to sit at the table at the window of the crib, but had to go
to the back instead.
13. One night when Williams came to work she found a buggy (a motorized cart
used to haul supplies) sitting on a wooden skid and blocking the other bug-
gies. She had to find a co-worker to help her move it.
14. On one occasion a female hourly worker, Shalimar Kufchak, padlocked the
crib's main entrance while Williams was inside.
15. On a couple of occasions materials were stacked in front of the alternate exit,
blocking access in and out.
72. Id. at 562 (quoting the district court's unpublished order).
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ment, the district court found that the conduct alleged was more like
oafish pranks and foul language than sexual harassment because of
sex, and as such, it did not satisfy the totality of circumstances test. 73
In an unpublished opinion, the lower court found the conduct
neither severe nor pervasive enough to sustain William's claim and
granted summary judgment to GMC.7 4
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 75 It stated that the
district court misapplied the totality of the circumstances test and fur-
ther emphasized that the Sixth Circuit "reject[s] the view that the
standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environ-
ment. '76 Furthermore, the court refused to consider the work envi-
ronment as a factor because "women working in the trades do not
deserve less protection from the law."77
The Williams court reasoned that its test was appropriate because
it comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress's in-
tent in enacting Title VII (i.e., to eradicate hostile work environ-
ments) 78 and because an assumption of risk defense is inappropriate
in the context of a hostile work environment claim. 79
The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment.' "80 The Williams court seemed to believe that its ap-
proach of not considering workplaces that are traditionally hostile was
the way to eradicate this entire spectrum of disparate treatment. Fur-
thermore, the court opined that taking into account the pre-existing
work environment is tantamount to allowing employers to claim that
the employee assumed the risk by seeking employment in such an en-
vironment.81 The Williams court reasoned that allowing employers an
assumption of risk defense is inappropriate in a sexual harassment
action because a woman who chooses to work in a male-dominated
field should not have to relinquish her right to be free from sexual
harassment.8 2
73. See id.
74. See id. at 563.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 564.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 563-64.
79. See id. at 564.
80. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
81. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
82. See id.
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1. The Intent of Title VII
The Williams court reasoned that its holding is consistent with the
intent of Title VII to prevent workplaces from using the defense that
they have a history of hostility toward women, to excuse hostile work
environment harassment.83
The Williams approach serves the purpose of Title VII because it
provides a victim with recourse for discrimination brought about by
severe or pervasive conduct that creates a hostile work environment.
84
The Williams court insists that allowing an employer to claim that the
environment has always been rough or hostile merely perpetuates the
problem.8 5 Furthermore, allowing such a defense gives an employer
no incentive to discipline the conduct or make the environment less
hostile. According to the Williams court, "the more hostile the envi-
ronment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is
for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment."8 6
Realistically, employers will rarely claim that their work environ-
ment has traditionally been hostile; the employer may point to boor-
ish behavior and language that by itself could not be considered
actionably hostile, but will not rely on an assertion that their workplace
is traditionally "hostile." In its attempt to broaden the reach of Title
VII, Williams misses the point. The point is not whether a hostile envi-
ronment should be considered as a threshold question, but whether
the pre-existing environment should be considered. Whether or not the
environment is "hostile" for Tide VII purposes is a question of fact.
87
The Williams approach theoretically prevents the trier of fact from ac-
curately determining what constitutes severe or pervasive conduct be-
cause the approach prevents an initial determination of the pre-
existing work environment. Workplaces vary greatly, and a court or a
jury will not be able to determine what is severe or pervasive in a par-
ticular environment without first considering what conduct is normal
in that environment.
In Oncale, the Supreme Court held that the "inquiry requires
careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior





87. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
88. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
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the Williams court gave ample weight to the perception of the target
element of the analysis, yet it completely ignored the social context
element of the inquiry.8 9 However, any consideration of the social
context is impossible without first considering the particular work en-
vironment. Williams properly focuses on the perception of the con-
duct by its target element,90 but by completely ignoring the social
context element of the rule, a court could subject employers to liabil-
ity for conduct that was essentially the norm (but not hostile) in that
field if one person perceived the conduct to be severe or pervasive.
2. The Assumption of Risk Defense
The assumption of risk defense "is based on the plaintiff's express
or implied agreement to shift the legal responsibility for possible in-
jury from the negligent defendant onto the plaintiff."91 While nor-
mally a tort defense, assumption of risk in the employment context
assumes that an employee who is not forced to stay at her job implic-
itly consents to the work environment by her willingness to stay.92
Therefore, the assumption of risk defense implies that a single em-
ployee may waive her Title VII rights. This would have the effect of
allowing some employees to opt out of protections Title VII was de-
signed to provide, "which may be contrary to the goal of Title VII." 93
The assumption of risk defense, however, is not meant to require
an employee to relinquish Title VII rights. The assumption of risk de-
fense will never immunize male-dominated trades from being liable
for conduct that amounts to sexual harassment because conduct that
is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment
will always be actionable. In Williams, the court stated "[w]e do not
believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated
trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment."94
While this is true, there is a difference between male-dominated
trades and conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the
terms and conditions of employment. A woman who decides to work
in a male-dominated trade may be assuming the risk of witnessing
boorish behavior or hearing language that is unfit for the courthouse,
89. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 566.
90. See id.
91. Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims? 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1117 (1995).
92. See id. at 1120.
93. Id. at 1148.
94. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).
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but she does not assume the risk of actionable conduct under Title
VII.
Furthermore, ignoring an assumption of risk defense is impracti-
cal because doing so would eliminate employment where women are
currently free to market their sexuality and receive economic benefit
from their sex appeal. 95 It would eliminate the recognition that wo-
men have the capacity "to make voluntary choices about where they
work and to take responsibility for those choices. '96 Eliminating the
assumption of risk defense would "perpetuate the perception of wo-
men as unable to make rational decisions about their sexuality and
encourages the state to protect women from themselves."9 7 Therefore,
barring an assumption of risk defense would be regressive and would
defeat Title VII's goal of putting women and men on equal footing in
employment situations.
B. Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.
In Gross, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff put forth a viable Title VII sexual harass-
ment claim a court "must first examine her work environment."98 The
plaintiff, Patricia Gross, was a truck driver on a construction site in
Wyoming. 99 Gross drove a water truck for Burggraf Construction
Company during the 1989 construction season and was hired again in
mid-May of 1990 to work that year's season. 00 Gross was laid off in
October 1990 because the water truck was no longer needed. 101 Gross
filed a Title VII action claiming that she had been subjected to hostile
environment gender discrimination and listed ten instances that she
alleged were actionable. 1°2 The district court granted Burggraf sum-
95. See Cahill, supra note 91, at 1144-45. Cahill further states that an "assumption of
risk defense recognizes that women can voluntarily choose to work in establishments that
promote their sex appeal and holds women responsible for that choice by not allowing
them to recover for harassing conduct they knew was likely to occur when they accepted
the job." [d. at 1146.
96. Id. at 1145.
97. Id. at 1147.
98. Id. at 1537.
99. See id. at 1535.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1536, listing the ten instances of alleged harassment as follows:
Anderson [her supervisor] referred to her as a "cunt"; 2) [after]Anderson was
unable to elicit a response from Gross over the CB radio, he made the following
statement to another Burggraf employee: "Mark, sometimes, don't you just want
to smash a woman in the face?"; 3) on one occasion, as she left her truck, Ander-
son yelled at her: "What the hell are you doing? Get your ass back in the truck and
[Vol. 37
UNSUSPECTING EMPLOYERS AND TITLE VII
mary judgment on the Title VII claim "based upon its determination
that there were no genuine issues of material fact" regarding her
claim. 103 The Tenth Circuit's issue on appeal was whether the em-
ployer's conduct and statements created a hostile work
environment. 10 4
In applying the totality of circumstances test from Harris, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the instances of dis-
crimination alleged in Gross's complaint were not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to rise to the level of discrimination, as based on her
sex. 0 5 Citing its holding in Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,10 6 the court
stated "[i]f the nature of an employee's environment, however un-
pleasant, is not due to her gender, she has not been the victim of sex
discrimination as a result of that environment. " 107 Furthermore, in ap-
plying the objective-subjective test from Harris, the court evaluated
Gross's claim "in the context of a blue collar environment where
crude language is commonly used by male and female employees." s
After hearing Ms. Gross's deposition testimony that she, herself, "con-
tributed to the use of crude language on the job site,"'09 the court
determined that the defendant's conduct was neither objectively nor
subjectively severe or pervasive enough to be actionable. 1 0 By examin-
ing the context of the work environment, the court determined that a
hostile work environment claim was improper. 1 '
Three important reasons support using the Gross approach over
the Williams approach. First, stare decisis requires a court to consider
the work environment in order to adhere to the Supreme Court's to-
don't you get out of it until I tell you;" 4) Anderson referred to Gross as "dumb"
and used profanity in reference to her; 5) only two women out of the forty who
worked under Anderson's supervision completed the 1990 construction season;
6) Anderson hired Gross solely to meet federal requirements against gender dis-
crimination; 7) Anderson disliked women who were not between the ages of 1 "
and 25 and who weighed more than 115 pounds; 8) Anderson approached Gross
after work one day and offered to buy her a case of beer if she would tell another
Burggraf employee to "go fuck himself;" 9) Anderson warned Gross that if she
ruined the transmission on her truck she would be fired; and, 10) Anderson
threatened to retaliate against Gross because he had heard that she was contem-
plating filing an EEOC claim.
103. Id. at 1535.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1547.
106. 19 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 1994).
107. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537 (quoting Stahl, 19 F.3d at 538).
108. Id. at 1537-38.
109. Id. at 1538.
110. See id. at 1547.
111. See id.
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tality of the circumstances test. Second, the Gross approach comports
with the Court's objective-subjective test because it requires an objec-
tive person's assessment of the work environment in question. Finally,
public policy dictates that a court should assess the work environment
when making a hostile environment determination because the courts
were not "commissioned by Congress to force a heightened level of
civility upon the blue collar workplace-or any other, for that mat-
ter-by redefining workplace sex discrimination far more broadly
than . . . Title VII."1 12
1. The Work Environment Element and the Totality of the
Circumstances Test
The Supreme Court clearly stated that the particular work envi-
ronment must be evaluated when examining the totality of the cir-
cumstances. The Court analogized that a "professional football
player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive,
for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads
onto the field-even if the same behavior would reasonably be exper-
ienced as abusive by the coach's secretary ... back at the office."" 3 As
the conduct in the analogy changes two variables-the locus of the
conduct and the target of the conduct-it is unclear which is the de-
termining factor in the analogy. 14 Williams concentrates strictly on
the target and ignores the locus, 15 whereas Gross, which predates the
Oncale analysis, determines the conduct in relation to the locus. 1 1 6 In
any case, the Court seems to mandate that the work environment be a
factor in determining whether conduct is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to amount to an actionable Title VII claim. 17
The Gross approach is consistent with the totality of the circum-
stances test because it applies equally to all work environments. The
Tenth Circuit's analysis does not operate merely to excuse boorish
112. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 572 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
113. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
114. In other words, if the coach were to smack the football player in the buttocks as he
was leaving the coach's office, would this be considered sexual harassment; or if the secre-
tary were on the field during the game and the coach were to smack her on the buttocks,
would that be sexual harassment? This illustrates the importance of the social context in
which the conduct occurs and that it must be examined in conjunction with the subjective
and objective analysis to determine if the player or the secretary actually perceived the
conduct as severe and pervasive as to alter his or her working conditions.
115. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
116. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538.
117. See id.
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behavior. For example, in Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance,
Inc.,"18 another Tenth Circuit decision, the court found it proper to
lower the threshold behavior for a plaintiff because she did not work
"where the rough and tumble surroundings ... make vulgarity and
sexual epithets common and reasonable conduct."1 19 Thus, only by
considering the work environment can a court properly assess the se-
verity and pervasiveness of the conduct to determine whether a hostile
environment exists. By contrast, the approach to the totality of the
circumstances test used by the Sixth Circuit in Williams, which refuses
to take into consideration the work environment, falls short of the
Supreme Court's mandate because it fails to provide the jury with the
context of any relevant incidents as indicated in Oncale.120
2. The Work Environment Element and the Objective-Subjective
Test
The Gross approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
objective-subjective test. The objective-subjective test requires that the
court determine whether "the environment would be reasonably per-
ceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." 121 A court cannot accu-
rately determine the conduct as hostile or abusive by focusing on the
words or acts outside of the context of the work environment. In On-
cale, the Court stated that "[t]he real social impact of workplace be-
havior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully cap-
tured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed."1 22 Thus, the Court mandates that the work environment
be a factor in the determination of what constitutes a hostile work
environment. The Gross approach, while predating Oncale, is true to
that requirement. 123
3. The Work Environment Element and Public Policy
Public policy supports the Gross approach requiring an assess-
ment of the workplace because Title VII does not commission the
courts "to force a heightened level of civility upon the blue-collar
118. 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. Id.
120. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
121. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
122. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
123. Id. at 81.
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workplace."' 124 Nor does it prohibit all of the verbal or physical harass-
ment that takes place at one's work;'2 5 rather "it is directed only at
'discyiminat[ion]... because of... sex.'"26 People deserve to be pro-
tected from discriminatory conduct that interferes with conditions of
their employment. However, a national standard of workplace con-
duct is neither feasible nor necessary. The Supreme Court has "never
held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and
women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because
the words used have sexual content or connotations."' 27 The reality is
that there are people who have marketable skills but either lack social
skills or are merely unpleasant to be around. Inevitably, employers will
have some employees working with others whose behavior they find
disagreeable, but this does not create a hostile work environment
under Title VII. It is imperative for the employer, not Congress or a
court, to ensure that the conduct of boorish or offensive employees
does not rise to the level of affecting another employee's terms and
conditions of employment. Furthermore, when a Title VII claim is
brought, the court must first consider the underlying circumstances
surrounding the alleged conduct and assess the work environment to
prevent Title VII from becoming a "general civility code for the Amer-
ican workplace."1 28
By examining the alleged conduct in its context, the Gross ap-
proach allows courts and juries to determine what conduct crosses the
Title VII threshold and becomes actionable as a hostile work environ-
ment. The Supreme Court noted that "[ciommon sense and an ap-
propriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find se-
verely hostile or abusive." 129 Therefore, the Court has indicated that
the social context (i.e., the work environment where the conduct took
place) must be assessed by the trier of fact, who must distinguish be-
tween proper and improper social conduct within the context of its
environment.
Ultimately, Gross is more consistent than Williams in its applica-
tion of the Supreme Court test as refined by Oncale. Furthermore, in
124. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 572 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
125. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
126. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
127. 1d.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 82.
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its application, the Williams approach creates major problems for an
employer in light of the Faragher and Ellerth decisions on the issue of
vicarious liability because of the employer's narrow defenses as dis-
cussed in Part I.130
III. The Circuit Split's Effect on Employer Liability-The
Williams Time Bomb
This Comment's first issue is whether an employer can reasonably
anticipate a Title VII hostile environment suit where no single act is
actionable. That determination depends on the circuit where the case
is filed, because if a court is unwilling to consider the work environ-
ment as a factor, then the employer's affirmative defense under Ellerth
and Faragher may not be sufficient.1 3 1 There may be potential conduct
in the workplace that is considered normal by employees that, taken
out of context, would be found offensive. Even though the conduct
does not, by itself, cross the threshold of being actionable under Title
VII, if it is persistent, it may cross that line. Therefore, the circuit split
as to whether to consider the work environment is critical in the analy-
sis because an employer needs to reasonably know if the environment
is one that may be considered hostile.
The Williams decision is a potential time bomb for both employ-
ers and employees. Its ruling cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's holdings in Faragher and Ellerth. The Williams decision states "a
work environment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal definition of
an abusive work environment, for purposes of a hostile environment
claim, even though no single episode crosses the Title VII thresh-
old."13 2 However, the employer's affirmative defense provided by the
Supreme Court in Faragher and ELerth requires that an employer satisfy
two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
130. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
131. Id. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)
(affirming summary judgment stating that the court should evaluate the plaintiffs claim in
the context of a blue-collar environment) with Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d
553, 572 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the court should not vary the standard depending on
the work environment). The affirmative defense requires the employer to take reasonable
measures to prevent and address harassment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. However, what
may seem reasonable in a blue-collar environment may not provide enough protection in
an office and thus, may be considered unreasonable.
132. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
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any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise."' 3 3 So how should an employer address,
or why would an employee report, conduct that is not perceived as
actionable?
The Williams holding puts both the employer and employee at
risk of losing a lawsuit. For example, in the hypothetical situation
presented in the Introduction, if Kathy Brady is a plaintiff in a Williams
district and she brings a hostile environment suit against Diamond
Construction alleging that the hostile environment was caused by a
supervisor or immediate superior, but no single act crossed the Title
VII threshold, Diamond can be liable under Ellerth/Faragher. Diamond
could lose its affirmative defense without ever realizing that a single
sexual harassment incident occurred. Diamond would not fulfill its
responsibility on the first ElLerth/Faragher prong simply because it had
no knowledge of the incidents. Furthermore, if Brady was reasonable
in not reporting the incidents as they occurred (for example, if the
incidents were minor and were not individually actionable, an em-
ployee's failure to report such incidents could be found reasona-
ble), ' 3 4 then the employer, Diamond, loses its ELerth/Faragher defense.
Similarly, Brady may put up with harassing behavior, none of
which individually crosses the Title VII threshold, without com-
plaining, even though the behavior bothers her and affects her work
environment. Collectively, those claims may amount to sexual harass-
ment in a Williams jurisdiction. However, because of the Ellerth/
Faragher affirmative defense, Brady would be at risk of losing her en-
tire cause of action under Title VII if she never reported the incidents.
In the absence of a single incident crossing the Title VII threshold,
how will an employee know what uncomfortable behavior is actiona-
ble, or even reportable, in order to protect his or her rights? In addi-
tion, this scenario raises another important question: At what point
will a number of acts that would not individually be actionable under
Title VII, collectively become actionable as a Title VII claim?
133. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). See also Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
134. See Willianm, 187 F.3d at 567.
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IV. The Proposed Solutions
A. Distinguish Sex-Based or Discriminatory Conduct From
Uncomfortable Behavior Absent a Sex-Based Nexus
Undoubtedly, Title VII proscribes gender-based harassment. In
addition, courts should interpret the Harris "totality of circumstances"
test to allow a plaintiff to include incidences of sexual harassment or
hostile acts based on the employee's sex or motivated by some anti-gender
animus. In the aggregate, however, courts should be hesitant to admit
the plaintiffs allegations of hostile or uncomfortable behavior absent
a sex-based nexus. In this respect, the Williams approach is too broad.
It does not comport with the Supreme Court's affirmative defense
provided in Ellerth/Faragher, nor with the Oncale opinion stating that
"Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace; it is directed only at 'discriminat[ion] . . . because of...
sex."'"' 35 The court's emphasis on the term "discrimination" is impor-
tant because absent some kind of workplace discrimination, Title VII
is inapplicable.' 3 6 Therefore, claims of offending behavior alleged by
a plaintiff should not be actionable, even in the aggregate, unless they
are sex-based or discriminatory.
B. Employer Prevention Programs
The solution for employers is prevention. The employer should
take affirmative steps to ensure that there are no Title VII sexual har-
assment claims budding among its employees.
If an employer takes reasonable steps to discover and rectify the
harassment of its employees ... it has discharged its legal duty. An
employer's response to alleged instances of employee harassment
must be reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment under
the particular facts and circumstances of the case at the time that
the allegations are made. 137
The message is clear. To avoid going to trial and losing a Title VII
sexual harassment suit, employers must take preventive measures.
"Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harass-
ment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expres-
sing strong disapproval, [and] developing appropriate sanctions
135. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
136. See id. at 80-81.
137. Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting McKenzie
v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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.... ,,138 Employers need to keep the channels of communication
open, take the time to investigate all incidences of tangible employ-
ment action and conduct that satisfies the sex-based nexus or discrimi-
natory-based nexus to preserve their affirmative defense in the event
of a sexual harassment suit. Employers must take the lead in their
respective fields to eradicate any disparate treatment in the workplace.
C. Employee Education
Employers should educate their employees on the difference be-
tween proper and improper conduct for the workplace. Absent any
clear statutory guidelines, employers and employees are free to deter-
mine the norms for their individual and collective work environments.
With employee input and employer guidelines, employee handbooks
can be developed to put both employers and employees on notice
concerning their rights under the law and expected conduct at the
workplace. The employer should "inform[ ] employees of their right
to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and
develop[ ] methods to sensitize all concerned." 3 9 In addition, a
proper workplace orientation and a sufficient probationary period al-
low employers and employees to learn whether that work environ-
ment is appropriate or comfortable for them.
By following prevention guidelines and using common sense, Ti-
tle VII will not become a general civility code. It does, however, com-
pel employers to adopt policies that do not tolerate discrimination in
any form. By adopting such policies, the employer can show that it
used reasonable care in its prevention and correction practices to as-
sert the narrow defenses offered by ElLerth and Faragher.
Conclusion
Returning to the hypothetical situation posed at the beginning of
this Comment, the result of Kathy Brady's appeal against Diamond
Construction should not depend on which circuit court of appeals
hears her case. Currently, if Brady's case is brought in the Fifth or
Sixth Circuits, she will probably get a trial at the district court, but if
she is in the Eighth or Tenth Circuits, she likely will not. It makes little
sense that under a federal law such as Title VII, a plaintiff would be
allowed to present her case to ajury in one circuit, while in another
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2002).
139. Id.
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circuit, under the same facts, she would not survive summary
judgment.
Either judicially or legislatively, the totality of the circumstances
test should be nationally refined to avoid regional disparity in the
treatment of American employees and employers. For employers to
have fair warning, the test needs to retain the ability for an employee
to allege incidences that are sex-based or discrimination based, but
not to allow peripheral claims that fall short of Title VII's purview.
Furthermore, the pre-existing work environment must be rationally
reviewed by the court or the jury. Only by considering normal circum-
stances or "social context" can the finder of fact determine whether
an employee's work environment has been sufficiently altered to war-
rant a Title VII claim. Finally, with employer prevention and educa-
tion policies implemented, the workplace will better reflect societal
norms, making an objective analysis of actionable conduct much eas-
ier while still preserving the affirmative defense for the good faith
employer.
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